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Abstract  
In his A Treatise of Freewill, Ralph Cudworth argues against Stoic 
determinism by drawing on what he takes to be other concepts found in 
Stoicism, notably the claim that some things are ‘up to us’ (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) and 
that these things are the product of our choice (προαίρεσις). These concepts 
are central to the late Stoic Epictetus and it appears at first glance as if 
Cudworth is opposing late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic 
determinism. This paper argues that in fact, despite his claim to be drawing 
on Stoic doctrine, Cudworth uses these terms with a meaning first 
articulated only later, by the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of 
Aphrodisias.  
 
When Ralph Cudworth died in 1688 he left his magnum opus, The True 
Intellectual System of the Universe, unfinished, having only published in 1678 
the first of three intended parts.1 The original plan, outlined in the Preface 
published with the first part, was to confront three philosophical enemies: 
atheism, moral subjectivism, and determinism.2 Material intended for the 
second and third parts was published posthumously, in 1731 and 1838, 
under the respective titles A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable 
Morality and A Treatise of Freewill.3 The latter was drawn from one of five                                                         
1 The True Intellectual System of the Universe: The First Part, Wherein all the Reason and 
Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted and its Impossibility Demonstrated (London: Richard 
Royston, 1678). An abridged version by Thomas Wise was published in 1706 and a Latin 
translation with notes by J. L. Mosheim was published in 1733. A second English edition 
by Thomas Birch was published in 1743 and this was reissued in 1820. A new edition in 
1845 included Mosheim’s notes, translated from the Latin by John Harrison. All 
references are to the first edition.  
2 The True Intellectual System, Preface, fol. 2 v.: ‘And all these three under that one general 
title of The True Intellectual System of the Universe, each book having besides its own 
particular title: [1] as against atheism; [2] for natural justice and morality, founded in 
the Deity; [3] for liberty from necessity’ (numbers added; punctuation and capitalization 
modernized).  
3 A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality […] With a preface by […] 
Edward Lord Bishop of Durham (London: James & John Knapton, 1731) and A Treatise of 
Freewill, Now first edited, from the original MS., and with notes, by John Allen (London: 
John W. Parker, 1838). Both texts are reprinted in A Treatise Concerning Eternal and 
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manuscripts containing material arguing against determinism, now all in 
The British Library.4  
 
Cudworth makes clear in his Preface that his original intention was simply 
to write ‘a discourse concerning liberty and necessity’ and in particular to 
write ‘against the fatal necessity of all actions and events’.5 Of his three 
philosophical enemies Cudworth held determinism to be the most 
dangerous because, by undermining the role of praise and blame, it makes 
‘a day of judgement ridiculous’ and thereby destroys respect for God.6 
Cudworth opens The True Intellectual System by raising the problem of ‘the 
necessity of all human actions and events’ but soon moves on to tackle 
various forms of atheism, deferring his main task to the never-completed 
third part.7 Cudworth’s short posthumous A Treatise of Freewill stands as 
fragment of what was planned to be the summit and completion of his 
philosophical project.  
 
Cudworth’s approach to the problem of atheism in A True Intellectual System 
was to suggest that the best way to get philosophically clear about the 
various forms that atheism can take is to trace those positions to their 
earliest, and so clearest, expressions in antiquity. In the case of atomistic 
atheism, for instance, it is necessary to go back beyond Epicurean 
libertarianism to the original Democritean position in order to realize that                                                         
Immutable Morality with A Treatise of Freewill, edited by Sarah Hutton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). All subsequent references to A Treatise of Freewill are 
to the original chapter divisions followed by the pagination of Hutton’s edition.  
4 The Cudworth MSS on liberty and necessity are BL Addit. 4978-82, of which 4978 
became A Treatise of Freewill. For a description of these see J. A. Passmore, Ralph 
Cudworth: An Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 110-13. For a 
transcription of the opening pages of BL Addit. 4981, with an introduction by J.-L. 
Breteau, see The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context, edited by G. A. J. Rogers, J. 
M. Vienne, and Y.-C. Zarka (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 217-31.  
5 The True Intellectual System, Preface, fol. 1 r.  
6 Ibid.  
7 The True Intellectual System, 3.  
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atheism and determinism are inevitably intertwined.8 However, Cudworth 
goes further and suggests that if these doctrines are traced back far enough 
we shall realize that all forms of atheism are mere corruptions of earlier 
forms of theism, and so he credits atomistic theism (of which Democritean 
atomistic atheism is a corruption) to one Mochus of Sidon.9  
 
We find the same methodological approach at work in Cudworth’s A 
Treatise of Freewill, where he identifies the determinism of Hobbes as one of 
his principal targets but then traces the view back to antiquity, turning to 
Cicero’s De fato for an account of the Stoic version of determinism.10 What 
is striking about Cudworth’s argument against Stoic determinism, 
however, is the way in which he explicitly claims to draw on Stoic doctrine 
for resources in his fight against the Stoics. Although the Stoics propose a 
pernicious form of thoroughgoing determinism they also, Cudworth 
suggests, acknowledge that rational beings are able to act freely. Cudworth 
writes ‘according to that Stoical doctrine that the truest and greatest goods 
and evils of rational beings consist ἐν τοὶς προαιρετικοὶς or ἐν τοὶς ἐφ᾽ 
ἡμῖν [i.e.] in their own free willed actions or things in their own power’.11 
The Stoic concepts that Cudworth alludes to here, the ideas that some 
things are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or ‘up to us’ and that these are in some way connected 
to our προαίρεσις or choice, play a central role in the philosophy of the late 
Stoic Epictetus. It looks, at first glance, as if Cudworth is drawing on late 
Stoic voluntarism to attack early Stoic determinism, in effect turning 
Stoics against Stoics.                                                          
8 See The True Intellectual System, Preface, fol. 3 v.  
9 See The True Intellectual System, 12.  
10 See A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 2, pp. 158-9, citing Cicero, De fato 35. On Cudworth’s 
polemics against Hobbes see S. I. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century 
Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962), 96-102, 126-33; Y.-C. Zarka, ‘Critique de Hobbes et fondement 
de la morale chez Cudworth’, in The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context , edited 
by G. A. J. Rogers, J. M. Vienne, and Y.-C. Zarka (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 39-52.  
11 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 157.  
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The aim of what follows is to examine this apparent turning of Stoics 
against Stoics in Cudworth’s discussion of free will and determinism. The 
first section outlines the central project of A Treatise of Freewill and 
discusses Cudworth’s objections to Stoic determinism. The second section 
examines the apparently Stoic terminology that Cudworth deploys in 
response to Stoic determinism, terminology that we find throughout the 
works of Epictetus. As we shall see, although this terminology is indeed 
central in Epictetus, the context in which he uses it is significantly 
different from the one in which Cudworth is working. The third and final 
section will suggest that, due to these differences, Cudworth cannot be 
using these concepts with the sense that Epictetus attaches to them. 
Instead it will be suggested that the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of 
Aphrodisias is a more likely source for Cudworth’s resources in his battle 
against Stoic determinism.  
 
1. Cudworth’s Project in A Treatise of Freewill   
 
Cudworth’s project in A Treatise of Freewill is to argue against all forms of 
determinism and in favour of the claim that we possess a free will. In the 
opening chapter of the text he says that we have a natural instinct that 
leads us to believe that some things are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or ‘in our own power’.12 
This natural instinct is illustrated by the fact that we praise and blame the 
actions of others, on the presumption that those actions were freely chosen, 
and by the fact that we feel guilt when we don’t act as well as we might, 
again presuming that those actions were freely chosen and so our own 
responsibility. We would not praise and blame and feel guilt, Cudworth 
claims, if human actions were necessary or determined.13 And when we                                                         
12 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 155.  
13 See A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 155.  
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encounter things that are necessary – or at least out of our control – such 
as illness for instance, we do not praise or blame people or feel a sense of 
guilt. So, our natural instinct on these matters separates out what is within 
our control from what is not. Our sense of justice, Cudworth suggests, 
offers another illustration of this inherent natural instinct concerning 
liberty and necessity.14 We do not punish the animal that acts viciously, 
even though we might restrain it, but we do punish the human who acts 
viciously precisely because we hold that it was within their power to act 
other than they did. Christian doctrine also teaches that we are free in our 
actions, so both natural instinct and Scripture agree that some things are 
ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or within our own power.15 The task of A Treatise of Freewill is to 
offer further illustrations of this fact and to undermine the arguments of 
those who deny it in favour of some form of determinism.  
 
In the second chapter Cudworth identifies his principal targets, naming 
Hobbes but then quickly moving back to antiquity in order to locate earlier 
examples of determinism.16 He quickly turns his attention to the Stoics, 
drawing as we have noted on Cicero, and it is then in the third chapter that 
Cudworth explicitly begins his argument against Stoic determinism. He 
begins by presenting their doctrine of cyclical recurrence, which posits 
periodic conflagrations of the world separating cycles of events, where each 
cycle is an exact and necessary repetition of the previous one, in which, as 
Cudworth puts it, ‘there must be all along the same or like men, doing all 
the same things exactly’.17 Cudworth objects that this not only seems to                                                         
14 See A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 156.  
15 See A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 157.  
16 See n. 10 above.  
17 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 3, p. 161. On the Stoic doctrine of cyclical recurrence see the 
fragments collected in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta [hereafter SVF], edited by H. von 
Arnim, 4 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903-24), 2.596-632. For discussion (with references to 
earlier literature), see R. Salles, ‘Determinism and Recurrence in Early Stoic Thought’, 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2003), 253-72.  
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rule out the possibility of any human freedom of action but it also turns 
God into a ‘necessary agent’, unable to change any events from one cycle 
to the next. He writes, ‘they supposing God Almighty himself to be a 
necessary agent too, and, therefore, that after the several conflagrations, he 
must needs put things in the very same posture he had before’.18 Here 
Cudworth is drawing on the account of Celsus, recorded, and then 
attacked, by Origen in his Contra Celsum.19 In responding to this Stoic 
doctrine Cudworth quotes at length from Origen’s response to Celsus,20 
which is another important source of evidence for wider Stoic thinking 
about human action and determinism, insofar as it reports the Stoic 
response to the famous ‘idle argument’,21 also recounted in Cicero.22 We 
can note, then, that while writing A Treatise of Freewill Cudworth had to 
hand two important sources for Stoic views on the issues with which he 
was concerned.23  
 
Having introduced his enemies in the second and third chapters, Cudworth 
proceeds to offer a whole series of responses to the various arguments 
against free will in the subsequent sections of the text. I shall not go 
through all of these here but I shall note that towards the end of the text 
Cudworth returns again to Hobbes and the Stoics, addressing their shared 
claim that ‘nothing can be without a cause, and whatsoever hath a cause                                                         
18 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 3, p. 161.  
19 See Origen, Contra Celsum (text edited by P. Koetschau in Die Griechischen Christlichen 
Schriftseller, 2 vols [Leipzig: Hinricks, 1899]) 4.67. I note the very helpful annotated 
translation by H. Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953).  
20 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 3, pp. 161-2, quoting Contra Celsum 4.67-8 (part SVF 2.626; 
trans. Chadwick, pp. 237-8).  
21 See Origen, Contra Celsum 2.20 (SVF 2.957; trans. Chadwick, p. 86). For discussion of 
the ‘idle argument’ (ἀργὸς λόγος) see e.g. S. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 182-98.  
22 See Cicero, De fato 28-30 (part SVF 2.956).  
23 As we shall see, I shall suggest that Cudworth may well have drawn on a third, equally 
important, source for Stoic determinism, namely Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De fato, which 
he also appears to have had at hand (cf. A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 6, p. 170).  
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must of necessity come to pass’.24 So, at both the beginning and the end of 
A Treatise of Freewill, the Stoics are conjoined with Hobbes, which is not a 
coupling that we might expect.25 And yet it is worth noting that others in 
the seventeenth century also branded Hobbes a Stoic when it came to 
determinism, notably John Bramhall in his discussions with Hobbes over 
liberty and necessity.26 There Bramhall characterizes Hobbes as a Stoic 
and here Cudworth writes of Hobbes’ position ‘this childish and ridiculous 
nonsense and sophistry of his was stolen from the Stoics too, who played 
the fools in logic after the same manner’.27  
 
So, Cudworth’s contemporary target Hobbes merely repeats an ancient 
error first made by the Stoics. If Cudworth can undermine the more noble 
ancient position then its modern derivatives will fall with it. The Stoic 
error is that they insist that: (a) everything must have a sufficient cause, 
and anything caused must necessarily come to pass;28 (b) the cyclical 
recurrence of events destroys individual freedom;29 and (c) God is placed 
under the power of necessity.30 In short, a range of features of Stoic physics 
undermines our belief in the autonomy of human action.  
 
 
                                                         
24 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 22, p. 203.  
25 On the perhaps unexpected connection between Hobbes and Stoicism see J. C. Kassler, 
‘The Paradox of Power: Hobbes and Stoic Naturalism’, in The Uses of Antiquity: The 
Scientific Revolution and the Classical Tradition, edited by S. Gaukroger (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1991), 53-78.  
26 See Bramhall’s debate with Hobbes on liberty, necessity, and chance in vol. 5 of The 
English Works of Thomas Hobbes, edited by W. Molesworth, 11 vols (London: John Bohn, 
1839-45), e.g. vol. 5, pp. 118, 148, 198, 238-9.  
27 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 22, p. 204.  
28 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 22, p. 203. 
29 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 3, p. 162. 
30 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 3, pp. 160-1. 
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2. Echoes of Epictetus  
 
At first glance, then, Cudworth is explicitly arguing against Stoic 
determinism. However, the matter is complicated when we pay attention to 
the terminology that Cudworth uses to articulate his own alternative to 
the determinist position. As we have seen, Cudworth opens the first 
chapter of A Treatise of Freewill by claiming that it is by natural instinct 
that we have a sense that some things are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or ‘in our own power’.31 
The phrase ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν has a long and complex history in ancient philosophy. 
We find it used by Aristotle, by early Stoics such as Chrysippus, by late 
Stoics such as Epictetus, by Plotinus, and by a range of other late ancient 
authors grappling with issues related to human action.32 These authors 
often use the phrase in quite different senses, so it is necessary to ask with 
which sense does Cudworth use the phrase. As we have seen, Cudworth 
suggests he is using the phrase in a Stoic sense.33 However, the early Stoic 
Chrysippus and the late Stoic Epictetus use the phrase with different 
senses.  
 
While for Chrysippus ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν refers simply to anything for which we 
might be the cause,34 for Epictetus it refers only to those things that are 
                                                        
31 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 155. 
32 For a helpful survey see E. Eliasson, The Notion of That Which Depends On Us in Plotinus 
and Its Background (Leiden: Brill, 2008).  
33 See A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 157, quoted above.  
34 There is unfortunately no direct evidence for the claim that Chrysippus used this 
phrase. Our most important sources for Chrysippus himself are in Latin, such as Cicero’s 
De fato (esp. 41-4 = SVF 2.974), and these use the phrase in nostra potesate. However, this 
is an almost standard Latin equivalent for ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν (and Cudworth himself uses it as such 
in the opening line of A Treatise of Freewill). The texts concerned with fate assembled in 
SVF (2.974-1007) that use ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν are all of a much later date (principally Alexander, 
Origen). The closest I have found to evidence for Chrysippus using ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν is the 
summary of his position in Nemesius, De natura hominis 35 (ed. M. Morani [Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1987], 105,12-17 = SVF 2. 991). See further, Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom, 
280-1; Eliasson, The Notion of That Which Depends On Us, 82-97.  
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completely under our control.35 For instance, if I choose to go for a walk 
and I meet no obstacles then the walk that I take is ‘up to me’ (or we might 
more naturally say ‘down to me’) in the sense of it being my action caused 
by me, on the early Stoic view.36 But for Epictetus walking is not one of the 
things ‘up to us’ because it is something that can always in principle be 
obstructed.37 I have no absolute control over whether I can go for a walk 
when I want to due to a whole range of external factors that might stop me 
from doing so. Only those things that are so completely under my control 
that they can never be hindered are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or ‘up to us’ according to 
Epictetus. Ultimately the only thing that is up to me in this sense is my 
judgement, the choices and assents that I make, my use of impressions as 
he sometimes puts it.38 By contrast my body and anything I might try to 
do in the physical world is not up to me due to the contingent obstacles 
that might intervene.39 I have no control over my body because I have no 
control over my health or a whole range of other factors that might impede 
it, but I do have control over the judgements that I make and no external 
factors can ever force me to change my judgement against my will. 
Epictetus’ concern here is not Cudworth’s metaphysical problem of free 
will, then, but rather a more practical concern with learning how to avoid 
frustration and disappointment. He offers an example of what Isaiah Berlin 
called ‘positive freedom’ and his remarks belong within the context of a 
debate about political liberty.40 Those remarks remain neutral with regard                                                         
35 See e.g. Epictetus, Enchiridion 1.1-2; Dissertationes 1.22.10. On this see Bobzien, 
Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, 331-8; Eliasson, The Notion of That Which 
Depends On Us, 109-14.  
36 This position is explicitly attributed to Chrysippus in Nemesius, De natura hominis 35 
(105,6-17 Morani; SVF 2. 991).  
37 The example of walking is discussed in Epictetus, Dissertationes 4.1.68-75.  
38 See e.g. Epictetus, Dissertationes 3.22.21; 3.22.103: ἡ χρῆσις τῶν φαντασιῶν. Epictetus 
gives us a list of things that count as ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν at Enchiridion 1.1.  
39 See Enchiridion 1.1 again for examples.  
40 See I. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in his Liberty, edited by H. Hardy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 166-217, esp. 186.  
  10 
to the question of causal determinism and that is a question that Epictetus 
does not really address. This neutrality means that his late Stoic position 
remains compatible with early Stoic determinism, even if at first glance he 
may appear heterodox.41 Consequently there is no philosophical dispute 
between Chrysippus and Epictetus even though they use ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν in quite 
different senses.  
 
There are two points here that are worth underlining. The first point is 
that if Cudworth is using ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν in a Stoic sense, as he claims, then he 
must be thinking of Epictetus, and not Chrysippus, given that he uses it to 
refer to human choice rather than causal responsibility. The second point 
concerns Cudworth’s conjoining of ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν with the notion of προαίρεσις 
or choice. As we have seen, Cudworth attributes to the Stoics the idea that 
‘the truest and greatest goods and evils of rational beings consist ἐν τοὶς 
προαιρετικοὶς or ἐν τοὶς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν [i.e.] in their own free willed actions or 
things in their own power’.42 Now, ἐν τοὶς προαιρετικοὶς is a phrase that 
we find in Epictetus’ Discourses,43 and προαιρετικά is a term that Epictetus 
uses interchangeably with ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν,44 and these introduce the key 
Epictetean concept of προαίρεσις.45 Epictetus uses this term to refer to our 
choice or volition, or even our self, for there is a sense in which for 
Epictetus our choice is all that is properly ours, for it is the only thing that 
                                                        
41 This appearance led R. Dobbin, ‘Προαίρεσις in Epictetus’, Ancient Philosophy 11 (1991), 
111-35, at e.g. 121, to claim that Epictetus broke with earlier Stoic determinism, but most 
commentators rightly reject that claim; see e.g. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom, 335.  
42 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 157.  
43 See e.g. Epictetus, Dissertationes 1.22.18; 2.1.10; 2.10.8-9; 4.10.8.  
44 See A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2002), 212.  
45 For discussion of the role of προαίρεσις in Epictetus see e.g. Dobbin, ‘Προαίρεσις in 
Epictetus’; Long, Epictetus, ch. 8; R. Sorabji, Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
ch. 10; R. Sorabji, ‘Epictetus on Proairesis and Self’, in The Philosophy of Epictetus, edited by 
T. Scaltsas and A. S. Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 87-98. 
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is ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or within our control.46 As before, this is a pragmatic ethical 
claim rather than a metaphysical one.  
 
The notion that there might be some conceptual connection between the 
terms ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν and προαίρεσις is not unique to Epictetus, however, as a 
connection between the two had been drawn by Aristotle, who defines 
προαίρεσις as ‘the deliberate desire of things ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν’.47 However it is 
worth noting that Epictetus and Aristotle conjoin the two notions in quite 
different ways.48 When Aristotle writes in the Nicomachean Ethics that 
προαίρεσις is ‘the deliberate desire of things ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν’,49 he is saying that 
our choice is a choice of things that are ‘up to us’; we choose between 
actions that are within our power, for instance; whereas for Epictetus it is 
our faculty of choice itself that has become the only thing properly ‘up to 
us’.50 Epictetus offers us an example in the opening chapter of the first 
book of the Discourses, where he imagines an exchange with a tyrant. To 
the tyrant who threatens to restrain him, Epictetus responds by saying 
‘You will restrain me? My leg you may chain up but my προαίρεσις not 
even Zeus himself has the power to control’.51 And elsewhere, in the                                                         
46 See e.g. Epictetus, Dissertationes 1.22.10. Note that, for a Stoic holding a monistic 
psychology, this ‘choice’ cannot be a separate faculty and so is often treated as simply 
another way of describing the self.  
47 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 3.3, 1113a10-11; lines 9-11 read: ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ 
βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ’ 
ἡμῖν. For discussion of Aristotle’s use of προαίρεσις see e.g. R. Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the 
Role of Intellect in Virtue’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1973-4), 107-29, esp. 
107-12; A. Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will (London: Duckworth, 1979), 69-80, along 
with the studies comparing Aristotle and Epictetus cited in the next note. For Aristotle 
on ἐφ’ ἡμῖν see E. Eliasson, The Notion of That Which Depends On Us, 47-61.  
48 For discussion of the difference between Aristotle and Epictetus see Bobzien, 
Determinism and Freedom, 402-3; Sorabji, Self, 188-91. Both are also discussed in C. H. 
Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine’, in The Question of “Eclecticism”: 
Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, edited by J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 234-59.  
49 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 3.3, 1113a10-11.  
50 See Epictetus, Dissertationes 1.22.10.  
51 Epictetus, Dissertationes 1.1.23 (a paraphrase rather than a translation).  
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Enchiridion, he writes that ‘illness is an impediment to the body, but not to 
one’s προαίρεσις’ and so illness is ‘an impediment to something else, but to 
not yourself’.52 For Epictetus, then, one’s προαίρεσις is what we essentially 
are, and identified with what is ‘up to us’. If I were trying to give a 
complete account of Epictetus’ position here I would of course need to add 
various qualifications,53 but the important point for our present purposes is 
that this is quite different from Aristotle’s view. So we need to be aware 
that there are two distinct relations between these technical terms 
available. But in any case, Cudworth is not talking about Aristotle here; as 
we have seen, he is explicit that he is thinking of Stoic doctrine, and among 
the Stoics it is Epictetus who conjoins these two terms.  
 
The first point we considered earlier shows that Cudworth uses ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν in 
an Epictetean rather than Chrysippean sense; now this second point shows 
that he joins ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν with προαίρεσις in an Epictetean rather than 
Aristotelian way. Both points suggest that Cudworth uses the phrase ἐφ᾽ 
ἡμῖν with the same sense given to it by Epictetus.  
 
Alongside ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν and προαίρεσις we find a third term with Stoic 
provenance in Cudworth and this is ἡγεμονικόν. Epictetus uses both 
προαίρεσις and ἡγεμονικόν regularly, although not quite synonymously.54 
In brief, the ἡγεμονικόν, which we might very loosely translate as mind, 
which is sometimes translated as ‘governing principle’, and which 
Christopher Gill has recently rendered as ‘control-centre’,55 overlaps with 
one’s προαίρεσις but it is broader, encompassing not only our choices but 
                                                        
52 Epictetus, Enchiridion 9 (same caveat).  
53 For the sorts of qualifications needed see Sorabji, Self, ch. 10.  
54 See Long, Epictetus, 211.  
55 C. Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 33.  
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also our impressions and impulses.56 One of these parts of the ἡγεμονικόν, 
our capacity to receive impressions, is passive, in the sense that we do not 
have control over the content of our impressions, so they are not ‘up to us’ 
in the way that our προαίρεσις or choice is. So, there is a difference 
between these two concepts.  
 
Cudworth introduces the term in Chapter 9, where he calls it ‘the ruling, 
governing, commanding, determining principle in us’,57 rolling a variety of 
possible translations all into one. It is here, in this ruling principle, that we 
shall find what is ‘up to us’ Cudworth suggests, following an Epictetean 
understanding of ‘up to us’.58 Cudworth also suggests that this concept of 
the ἡγεμονικόν was explored by ‘the Greek philosophers after Aristotle’,59 
without being any more specific, although at this point he cites Origen as 
his immediate source.60 But Cudworth’s gloss on the passage, drawing on 
the sixteenth century Latin translation of Sigismundus Gelenius, indicates 
that he understood the term to refer to each person’s reason (sua cuique 
ratio), a thoroughly rational principle which is the source of our good and 
bad actions;61 in other words, he seems to have understood the term in 
broadly the same sense as the Stoics did.  
 
In short, then, Cudworth’s defence of free will is made using terminology 
that designates three key and closely-related concepts that we find in the                                                         
56 See e.g. Aetius 4.21.1 (SVF 2.836); Diogenes Laertius 7.159 (SVF 2.837).  
57 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 9, p. 175.  
58 See A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 9, p. 175.  
59 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 9, p. 175.  
60 See Origen, Contra Celsum 4.65 (trans. Chadwick, p. 237).  
61 See Origenis Contra Celsum Libri Octo, edited by William Spencer (Cambridge, 1658), 
containing the Latin translation of Sigismundus Gelenius in parallel with the Greek text, 
p. 207, where Gelenius renders τὸ ἑκάστου ἡγεμονικόν as sua cuique ratio. Contra Hutton’s 
note to Cudworth’s text, p. 176, this edition does not contain a commentary by Gelenius 
(although it does contain some notes by Spencer and others); Cudworth is simply drawing 
on the translation.  
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late Stoic philosopher Epictetus: ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, προαίρεσις, and ἡγεμονικόν. 
While there is explicit evidence that Cudworth was well aware that these 
were Stoic terms, there isn’t any to confirm that he was taking them 
directly from Epictetus.62 He may have drawn on later sources influenced 
by Epictetus, such as Origen or the Neoplatonists, and the Neoplatonists of 
course borrowed from Stoicism, using their resources within a 
philosophical system that opposes itself to Stoic materialism and 
determinism.63 Cudworth was intimately familiar with the works of 
Plotinus and the subsequent Neoplatonists, and so it is possible that he 
may have taken the terms from any one of them.64 However, as we have 
seen, Cudworth explicitly attributes this notion to the Stoics, and as a rule 
the Neoplatonists rarely acknowledged their borrowings from the Stoa, 
making a Neoplatonic source less likely.  
 
Putting source questions to one side for the moment, what is striking here 
is the way in which Cudworth is deploying one set of Stoic concepts in 
opposition to another set, setting late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic 
determinism we might say. We might say, but we would be wrong to do so.                                                         
62 However there is plenty of evidence that Cudworth was familiar with Epictetus’ texts. 
Epictetus’ Enchiridion or Handbook opens with a distinction between those things that are 
‘up to us’ (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) and those that are not (οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν), and we know that Cudworth 
was familiar with this as he had a copy of the commentary on it written by the 
Neoplatonist Simplicius, which he cites in The True Intellectual System of the Universe (pp. 
231, 558). See the Bibliotheca Cudworthiana, sive Catalogus Variorum Librorum Plurimis 
Facultatibus. Insingnium Bibliothecae Instructissimae Rev. Doct. Dr. Cudworth (London, 
1690/1), 16, listing Heinsius’ edition of Simplicius’ Commentarius in Epicteti Enchiridion 
(Leiden, 1640). For discussion see P. Hadot, ‘La survie du Commentaire de Simplicius sur 
le Manuel d’Épictète du XVe au XVIIe siècles: Perotti, Politien, Steuchus, John Smith, 
Cudworth’, in Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, edited by I. Hadot (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1987), 326-67, esp. 351-54. Cudworth also owned two other editions of Epictetus as well; 
see the Bibliotheca Cudworthiana, 20, listing an edition of Wolf’s Enchiridion and 
Dissertationes (Cambridge, 1655), and 26, listing an edition of the Enchiridion (Leiden, 
1648). 
63 See A. Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics (Leiden: Brill, 1972), esp. the essay ‘Plotinus on 
Man’s Free Will’, 112-25.  
64 For instance, the notion of what is ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν is discussed at length by Plotinus in Ennead 
6.8, on which see Eliasson, The Notion of That Which Depends On Us, 187-215.  
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The reason why we would be wrong to do so is because, as I noted earlier, 
Epictetus’ use of these key terms does not take place within the context of 
a discussion about the metaphysical problem of free will versus 
determinism. Epictetus’ concern when he talks about our προαίρεσις and 
the fact that it is the only thing that is ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or ‘up to us’ is with what 
we might call a practical and pragmatic ethical issue about how to avoid 
frustration and disappointment in our lives. For if we make our happiness 
dependent upon the fulfilment of desires, the fulfilment of which is out of 
our control, then we are bound to find ourselves disappointed much of the 
time. But if we only desire those things that are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν then we shall 
never be disappointed. Thus Epictetus’ council is that our only object of 
concern should be our judgements, for these are the only things 
guaranteed to be within our control. This ethical advice says nothing about 
the question of whether our judgements are absolutely free from the 
influence of antecedent causes or whether they are necessarily determined 
by the state of our character, our existing beliefs, and so on. Epictetus 
doesn’t really take a stand on the metaphysical question that exercises 
Cudworth.  
 
This raises a number of questions, most notably why is it that Epictetus 
seemingly has no interest in the metaphysical problem of free will, and 
why and how is it that, despite this, Cudworth seems to be using this 
Epictetean terminology in his discussion of the metaphysical problem, 
terminology that it now looks as if it might not be relevant to that debate. 
In order to answer both of these questions (or at least to indicate where we 
might start to look for a answer) I want to bring into the discussion 
another ancient philosopher, one that Cudworth only mentions in passing 
in A Treatise of Freewill, namely the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of 
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Aphrodisias.65 As we shall see, a case can be made for the claim that it is 
Alexander, and not Epictetus, who stands behind Cudworth’s turn to the 
notion of some things being ‘up to us’ (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν).  
 
3. Echoes of Alexander of Aphrodisias  
 
It has been argued that the origins of the modern metaphysical problem of 
free will versus determinism, the problem with which Cudworth is 
concerned, can be found in Alexander’s De fato, written approximately a 
century after Epictetus flourished.66 This is why Epictetus does not really 
address himself to the free will problem, because it did not exist for him in 
the way in which we understand it now. Although it is suggested that the 
foundations for the problem can be found in the De fato, Alexander’s text is 
not itself explicitly about free will in the modern sense either.67 Instead it 
involves, within the context of a discussion about the nature of fate, a 
discussion about the nature of deliberation and how we should understand 
the notion of what is ‘up to us’. As we have already seen, this latter notion 
has different senses for Aristotle, the early Stoic Chrysippus, and the late                                                         
65 In particular, Alexander’s De fato, in Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta 
minora: Quaestiones, De fato, De mixtione, edited by I. Bruns, Supplementum Aristotelicum 
2.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), pp. 164-212. For an English translation with commentary, and 
a facsimile of Brun’s text, see R. W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate (London: 
Duckworth, 1983). For a more recent critical edition of the text, with a French translation 
see P. Thillet, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Traité du Destin (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1984). 
Cudworth mentions Alexander at A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 6, p. 170.  
66 See S. Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem’, 
Phronesis 43 (1998), 133-75, at e.g. 136. Others have argued that the problem arose earlier 
with Epicurus: see e.g. P. Huby, ‘The First Discovery of the Freewill Problem’, Philosophy 
42 (1967), 353-62. That view has been attacked in S. Bobzien, ‘Did Epicurus Discover the 
Free Will Problem?’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19 (2000), 287-337. More 
recently T. O’Keefe, Epicurus on Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
154, has suggested that Carneades, inspired by Epicurus, should be credited as the 
originator. The important point for my concerns here is that Alexander seems to have 
been the first to use ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν in a two-sided sense (Epicurus did not use this phrase 
preferring παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς; see e.g. Ep. Men. 133), and, as importantly, that neither Chrysippus 
nor Epictetus used it in a two-sided sense.  
67 See Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception’, 171-2.  
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Stoic Epictetus, and we have also seen that this is the idea with which 
Cudworth opens A Treatise of Freewill, in the very first line.68  
 
There are in Alexander’s discussion two senses of what is ‘up to us’, it has 
been suggested: a one-sided causative sense and a two-sided potestative 
sense.69 The one-sided causative understanding of the phrase is the one we 
encountered in Chrysippus, namely the idea that what are ‘up to us’ are 
those things that we cause to happen, where we play a part in the causal 
chain.70 This Alexander characterizes as fate working ‘through us’ (δι’ 
ἡμῶν).71 This, the early Stoic view, is the one that Alexander rejects. He 
writes, ‘For, doing away with men’s possession of the power of choosing 
and doing opposites, they say that what is ‘up to us’ is what comes about 
through us’.72 This is also the view that Cudworth rejects in A Treatise of 
Freewill.73 Cudworth’s own understanding of ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, operative in his 
polemic against Stoic determinism, is thus clearly not the same as the early 
Stoic one-sided causative understanding.  
 
The other sense of ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν in Alexander is the two-sided potestative 
understanding. This is the sense of the phrase that Cudworth does use. He 
describes it as a ‘power over ourselves, which infers a contingency or non-
necessity’ and fleshes this out as ‘a power over oneself, either of intending                                                         
68 See A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 155.  
69 See Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception’, 139-42; Eliasson, The Notion of That Which 
Depends On Us, 72-9.  
70 See the references in n. 34 above.  
71 See Alexander, De fato 181-2 (trans. Sharples, pp. 58-9), esp. 181,14: ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ 
γινόμενον καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν. In fact, it is not clear whether this is Alexander’s gloss on the 
Stoic position or simply a report of something said by some real Stoic opponent. The same 
phrase can be found in Nemesius, De natura hominis 35 (106,10-13 Morani). 
72 Alexander, De fato 181,13-14 (trans. Sharples, p. 58): ἀναιροῦντες γὰρ τὸ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς αἱρέσεώς τε καὶ πράξεως τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγουσιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι 
τὸ γινόμενον καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν. 
73 See e.g. A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 18, p. 197.  
  18 
or remitting and consequently of determining ourselves better or worse’.74 
For Cudworth, then, for something to be ‘up to us’ it has to be something 
actively within our power to have changed, rather than merely causally 
involving our participation. This is the other sense of the phrase that we 
find in Alexander’s De fato and it appears to have been introduced by 
Alexander himself for the very first time.75 Alexander claims simply to be 
following Aristotle,76 but Aristotle did not use the phrase in quite the same 
sense. For Aristotle, as we have seen, choice is a choice of things ‘up to us’, 
such as our actions.77 But choice itself is not presented as something that is 
‘up to us’ as it is later in Epictetus, and then Alexander, and then 
eventually Cudworth. It is on this very point that Cudworth makes his 
only reference to Alexander in A Treatise of Freewill, where he contrasts 
Alexander’s view with that of unnamed Scholastic philosophers.78 
Cudworth notes that Alexander is of the view that with ‘the same things 
being circumstant, the same impressions being made upon men from 
without, all that they are passive to being the same, yet they may, 
notwithstanding, act differently’.79 So here, Cudworth is following 
Alexander’s understanding of this phrase ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, rather than Aristotle, 
Chrysippus, or Epictetus, for it is in Alexander that we seem for the first 
time to find this phrase with both the Epictetean shift to a concern with                                                         
74 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 18, p. 197 and ch. 14, p. 185 respectively.  
75 See Alexander, De fato 181,5-6, with Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception’, 143. R. 
Salles, The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 109-10, 
suggests that a first step towards this position can already be found in Epictetus, but 
within the context of a concern with moral responsibility rather than freedom of the will. 
However, Epictetus’ Stoic monistic psychology commits him, as it did Chrysippus, to the 
view that actions necessarily reflect one’s character. The alternative view, held by 
Alexander and Cudworth, involves the claim that agents can act against their character. 
As Bobzien rightly notes (ibid.), on the Stoic view there is ‘no space for free will (i.e. for a 
decision making faculty that is causally independent of the mind’s individual nature)’.  
76 See Alexander De fato 164,13-14: ‘The book contains the opinion concerning fate and 
responsibility held by Aristotle’ (trans. Sharples, p. 41).  
77 See n. 47 above.  
78 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 6, p. 170.  
79 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 6, p. 170, and cf. Alexander, De fato 185,7-186,3.  
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choice itself and a concern with being able to choose other than we do.80 
Epictetus’ use of the phrase is neutral with regard to the metaphysical 
problem of free will but Alexander’s is not. The combination of the use of 
this phrase with both of these resonances and a desire to argue against the 
Stoic deterministic claim that nothing happens without a cause are features 
shared by both Alexander’s De fato and Cudworth’s A Treatise of Freewill. It 
is tempting to suggest that Alexander influenced Cudworth far more than 
Cudworth’s one passing reference to Alexander might imply. In the light 
of what we have seen thus far it looks as if Alexander might be the most 
plausible source for Cudworth’s supposedly Stoic terminology.  
 
There are a number of other parallels between the two works that might 
add further weight to this suggestion. We have seen that in the opening 
chapter of A Treatise of Freewill Cudworth claims that our natural instincts 
lead us to praise and blame others for their choices and to feel guilt over 
some of our own choices. The fact that we are led by nature to do these 
things Cudworth takes to be strong evidence in support of the claim that is 
it possible for agents to act other than they do. The same point is made by 
Alexander in Chapter 12 of De fato:  
 
[…] how it is not absurd to say that this mistake [of assuming 
we do have the power to act otherwise] is one that all men in 
common have made by nature? For we assume that we have 
this power in actions, that we can choose the opposite, and not 
that everything which we choose has causes laid down 
beforehand, on account of which it is not possible for us not to 
choose it; this is sufficiently shown also by the regret that often                                                         
80 Here I follow Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception’; for some critical comments see 
Eliasson, The Notion of That Which Depends On Us, 76-9. While the Epictetean shift to a 
concern with choice itself is present in Alexander, there remain some points of difference 
in how they understand choice, which is unsurprising given Alexander’s commitment to 
Aristotelianism (see Eliasson, op cit., 75-6).  
  20 
occurs in relation to what has been chosen. For it is on the 
grounds that it was possible for us also not to have chosen and 
not to have done this that we feel regret and blame ourselves 
for our neglect of deliberation. But also when we see others not 
judging well about the things that they have to do, we reproach 
them too as going wrong.81  
 
As in Cudworth, the fact we all by nature praise and blame and regret is 
offered as evidence by Alexander for the claim that human action is not 
completely determined by antecedent causes. A couple of lines later, 
Alexander adds:  
 
It is clear in itself that ‘what depends on us’ (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) is 
applied to those things over which we have the power of also 
choosing the opposite things.82  
 
This is close to the definition of ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν that Cudworth uses in the same 
chapter in which he also discusses praise and blame. He writes:  
 
we are to conclude that there is something ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, in our own 
power, and that absolute necessity does not reign over all 
                                                        
81 Alexander, De fato 180,24-181,3 (trans. Sharples, p. 58): ἣν πλάνην κοινῶς πάντας 
ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως πεπλανῆσθαι πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον λέγειν; ὅτι γὰρ ταύτην ἔχειν 
τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς προειλήφαμεν, ὡς δύνασθαι διαιρεῖσθαι τὸ ἀντικείμενον, 
καὶ μὴ πᾶν ὃ αἱρούμεθα ἔχειν προκαταβεβλημένας αἰτίας, δι’ ἃς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἡμᾶς μὴ 
τοῦτο αἱρεῖσθαι, ἱκανὴ δεῖξαι καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἱρεθεῖσιν γινομένη πολλάκις μετάνοια. ὡς 
γὰρ ἐνὸν ἡμῖν καὶ μὴ ᾑρῆσθαι καὶ μὴ πεπραχέναι τοῦτο μετανοοῦμέν τε καὶ μεμφόμεθα 
αὑτοῖς τῆς περὶ τὴν βουλὴν ὀλιγωρίας. ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄλλους ἴδωμεν μὴ καλῶς περὶ τῶν 
πρακτέων διαλαμβάνοντας, κἀκείνοις ἐπικαλοῦμεν ὡς ἁμαρτάνουσιν.   
82 Alexander, De fato 181,5-6 (trans. Sharples, p. 58): ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τούτων 
κατηγορεῖται, ὧν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡ ἐξουσία τοῦ ἑλέσθαι καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα, γνώριμον ὂν καὶ ἐξ 
αὐτοῦ.  
  21 
human actions, but that there is something of contingent 
liberty in them.83  
 
I am not arguing for a close textual parallel here but nevertheless it is 
striking that this use of the ubiquity of praise, blame, and guilt to argue for 
the existence of the ability to choose otherwise should appear in both 
works, in addition to the terminological parallels that have already been 
noted.  
 
Alongside the technical Greek terms that we have already encountered, 
Cudworth uses another Greek word to refer to the power of self-
determination in his account of free will, namely αὐτεξούσιον.84 This 
power over ourselves, residing in the ἡγεμονικόν, is a power ‘either of 
intending or remitting and consequently of determining ourselves better 
or worse’ and ‘infers a contingency or non-necessity’.85 Cudworth identifies 
this with what is ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, and in making this identification Cudworth 
again follows Alexander.86 Both the identification and Cudworth’s explicit 
definition make clear that he is following Alexander’s understanding of 
both terms.  
 
It is quite possible, of course, that Cudworth was simply drawing on 
subsequent discussions from late antiquity, which might display the 
influence of Alexander, rather than drawing on Alexander directly. One 
source that has been suggested is Origen.87 We also know, of course, that                                                         
83 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 1, p. 157.  
84 See e.g. A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 13, p. 185; ch. 14, p. 185; ch. 18, p. 197.  
85 A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 14, p. 185 and ch. 18, p. 197 respectively.  
86 See e.g. Alexander, De fato 182,20-24; 189,9-11. Alexander’s use of αὐτεξούσιον is 
discussed in Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception’, 164-7.  
87 See Hutton, p. 155, n. 1: ‘The likely source […] is the discussion of freewill in Origen’s 
Peri Archon’.  
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Cudworth was intimately familiar with the work of Plotinus and the 
subsequent Neoplatonic tradition, which drew on both Alexander and the 
Stoics in various ways. However, I doubt we could find another text that 
combines the range of issues and terminology employed by Cudworth as 
well as Alexander’s De fato does. It is also hard to imagine someone as well 
informed about ancient philosophy as Cudworth not looking very closely at 
Alexander’s De fato when writing about Stoic determinism, given that it is 
such an important source for the Stoic position.88  
 
4. Conclusions  
 
We have seen that Cudworth claims to be drawing on a Stoic doctrine of 
some things being ‘up to us’, and specifically our own choice being ‘up to 
us’, as ammunition against the Stoics’ own doctrine of determinism. 
Although he does not make it explicit, it seems that Cudworth’s intention 
is to try to turn Stoics against Stoics. Such a strategy would come as no 
surprise to readers of the first part of The True Intellectual System, where 
Cudworth deliberately ranges different forms of atheism against one 
another, enabling him to claim that ‘the kingdom of darkness [is] divided, 
or labouring with an intestine seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby 
destroying itself’.89  
 
However, we have also seen that this claim does not stand up to close 
scrutiny. Our opening supposition that Epictetus might be standing behind 
Cudworth’s use of these terms cannot be right. The definitions that 
Cudworth attaches to the terms that he claims belong to ‘Stoical doctrine’ 
do not correspond to what we find in Stoicism, either early or late. The                                                         
88 I have already noted that Cudworth mentions Alexander in A Treatise of Freewill (ch. 6, 
p. 170). He also mentions him in The True Intellectual System of the Universe (pp. 161-2, 170, 
240, 667, 715), citing De fato explicitly (at 667).  
89 The True Intellectual System, 142.  
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sense in which Cudworth uses ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν involves the claim that what is ‘up 
to us’ includes the ability to choose other than we do, and yet this two-
sided potestative sense of the phrase never played a part in Stoicism. 
Instead we must turn to Alexander to find this two-sided sense. Indeed, 
that Alexander might stand behind Cudworth’s discussion seems highly 
appropriate given that Alexander’s De fato might justly be described as the 
canonical ancient polemic against Stoic determinism. Despite appearances, 
then, Cudworth does not turn Stoics against Stoics or uncover a tension 
within Stoicism between determinism and voluntarism. The problem with 
which Cudworth is so concerned, whether we have the ability to act other 
than we do, did not yet exist for the Stoics. Cudworth is of course quite 
right to identify the Stoics qua determinists as a target for his polemics, but 
he must have turned elsewhere for the conceptual resources that he 
deploys in his fight against them.  
 
 
